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at Retrieving People Named Like Us
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In the present study, it was evaluated whether one’s own name may produce a self-
reference bias in memory for people. Results from Experiment 1 indicated that, in a
verbal fluency task, participants recalled a greater number of known (familiar or famous)
people with the same first name as their own than did paired participants, and vice
versa. In the first experiment, paired participants knew each other but were not close.
Experiment 2 examined whether this self-reference effect would still occur when the
comparison target was a close other. This experiment showed that such a self-reference
bias also occurred even when the paired persons were close (partners or very good
friends). Overall the present paper describes a new naturalistic case of the self-reference
effect.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past 40 years, many studies have suggested that processing one’s own name is prioritized
relative to other kinds of social information. One’s own name is a powerful cue for attention: it
is more easily perceived as a target and it causes more interference as a distractor (for reviews,
see Breska et al., 2011; Humphreys and Sui, 2016). However, it seems that one’s own name gains
cognitive priority only when it is presented within the focus of attention or when the participant is
set to process it (Gronau et al., 2003; Kawahara and Yamada, 2004; Breska et al., 2011; Yang et al.,
2013, but see Alexopoulos et al., 2012).
Recently, Cunningham (2016) suggested that this attentional advantage supports the self-
reference effect in memory. Previous studies have repeatedly shown that episodic memory is
better for self-related stimuli than for stimuli related to other people, for tasks involving an
explicit evaluation of personality adjectives (e.g., “Does the adjective ‘generous’ describe you/the
President?”; for a review, see Symons and Johnson, 1997) or for tasks requiring someone to
encode objects in a context of self- vs. other-ownership (Cunningham et al., 2008; van den Bos
et al., 2010; Turk et al., 2013). One’s own name in itself may produce a self-reference effect on
episodic memory: pairings between target stimuli and the self-name have been shown to elicit better
memory performance than pairings between a celebrity and target stimuli (Turk et al., 2008). This
bias has been found to occur even when the task required participants simply to report whether
a word appeared above or below their own name (or a celebrity’s name). Such an incidental effect
suggests that we tend to spontaneously form associations between self-related information, such as
our own name, and co-occurring external stimuli (see also Sui et al., 2012, Experiment 3D).
In this context, the aim of the present study was to evaluate whether the cognitive advantage
for one’s own name may also underpin a self-reference bias in memory for people. We examined
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1751
fpsyg-07-01751 November 7, 2016 Time: 13:36 # 2
Brédart Self-Reference and Memory for People
whether participants were particularly good at retrieving people
with the same first name as their own. It was predicted that, all
other things being equal, a participant would retrieve in memory
more familiar people with the same first name as their own than
a yoked participant would do. For example, imagine that two
colleagues David and Simon are paired and they perform a verbal
fluency task requiring to recall familiar (famous or personally
known) people. David should recall more people called “David”
but fewer people called “Simon” than Simon would do.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 examined whether, in a verbal fluency task,
participants recalled a greater number of known people with the
same first name as their own than did paired participants, and
vice versa.
Method
Participants
In the absence of previous research on the effect under study,
the sample size necessary to evaluate a medium size effect of 0.5
with a power of 0.8 at an alpha level of 0.05 for a two-tailed
matched pairs comparison was 34 (G∗Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007).
Thirty-four (16 females, 18 males) therefore participated in the
study, comprising members of the administrative staff, post doc
researchers, professors, senior researchers, and students from the
University of Liège, aged between 22 and 52 (M= 34.0; SD= 9.7).
The participants’ average educational level, as measured by the
number of years of study completed to achieve their highest
qualification, was 17.9 (SD = 2.5). The sample included 33
French-speaking Belgian and 1 French participants. The mean
absolute age difference between pair members was 2.8 (SD= 2.6).
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty
of Psychology, Speech and Language Therapy, and Education
of the University of Liège. All participants gave their written
informed consent prior to participation.
Procedure
To prevent the impact of first name frequency on the self-
reference effect, participants were placed in pairs (for example, X
and Y) and were asked to recall both people called X and people
called Y, so that each name represented a self-related stimulus
for one participant and an other-related stimulus for the other
participant, and vice versa. Participants within a pair knew each
other, were same gender colleagues but were not close to each
other (for example they shared no extra-professional activities).
Participants were tested individually and instructed to recall,
by writing down on a blank sheet of paper, as many people they
knew whose first name was X (or Y) as possible. It was specified
that these people could belong to different categories as various as
actors, singers, sportspeople, politicians, TV presenters, writers,
musicians, characters in novels, cartoons, movies, songs, or
famous individuals from any other category, but also non-famous
people that they knew personally (these different categories were
indicated on a sheet of paper that was placed in front of the
participant during the task). Participants were also instructed that
there was no obligation to give an exemplar for each category
and that giving several exemplars from the same category was
allowed. A 5-min time period was allocated for writing down a
list of people with each name. For both trials, participants were
given advance warning when there was 1 min left to complete
the task. Half of the participants first recalled people bearing
their own first name and then recalled people bearing the paired
participant’s first name, and the other half did it in the reverse
order. When a participant recalled a person but was unable
to produce that person’s surname he/she was asked to provide
precise biographical information about the person, for example
“She is my little sister’s best friend” and not simply “She is an
acquaintance.” At the end of each trial, the experimenter read
each name or description given by the participant and asked the
participant to define who each person was (e.g., David Bowie
is the singer; Jessica Day is a character in the television series
New Girl). This allowed us to disambiguate some responses (e.g.,
David Copperfield could be either a Charles Dickens’ character
or a famous magician) but also to identify people that were
unknown to the experimenter.
Results and Discussion
In the following analysis, the random factor was the participants’
names. In each pair of participants, the number of people
named X recalled by participant X was compared with the
number of people named X recalled by participant Y, and the
number of people named Y recalled by Y was compared with
the number of people named Y recalled by X. The participant’s
own name and the paired participant’s name were excluded to
calculate these numbers (if X’s name was John Smith and Y’s
name was Peter Brown, both John Smith and Peter Brown were
excluded in calculating the number of names recalled by X or
by Y). Only the persons whose first name was phonologically
identical to the target name (X or Y) were included, whatever
the spelling (e.g., “Katherine,” “Kathryn,” or “Catherine” were all
accepted). All analyses were performed using the Statistica 12
software.
Participants reported more people sharing their own first
name (M = 4.97; SD = 2.06) than did their paired participants
(M = 3.29; SD = 1.66), paired t(33) = 5.63, p < 0.0001, (Mdiff
Self vs. Other= 1.68 [95% CI 1.07, 2.28]; Cohen’s d = 0.98 [0.48,
1.48]). Over the 169 reported persons sharing the participants’
own name, only one person was a member of a participant’s
biological family.
The possibility could not totally be excluded that some
participants occasionally cheated by inventing people to enhance
their “performance.” To avoid this possible bias, the preceding
analysis was rerun on those persons whose existence could be
verified, (i.e., the experimenter knew the cited persons or found
them on the Internet via Google or on the University Intranet).
This analysis also indicated that participants reported more
people sharing their own first name (M = 3.29; SD = 2.05)
than did their paired participants (M = 2.15; SD = 1.35), paired
t(33)= 4.52, p< 0.0001, (Mdiff Self vs. Other= 1.15 [0.63, 1.66];
Cohen’s d = 0.79 [0.29, 1.29]).
The first experiment revealed a clear self-reference effect on
memory for people: participants could recall more people with
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the same first name as their own than could paired participants.
For example, Simon retrieved more people called Simon than
David did, but David retrieved more people called David than
Simon did. In this experiment, participants within a pair knew
each other but they were not close. Research has shown that
the self-reference effect on episodic memory can be diminished
or even eliminated when the comparison target is a close other
such as a parent, friend, or spouse (Bower and Gilligan, 1979;
Symons and Johnson, 1997). In the second experiment, it was
evaluated whether or not the self-reference effect on memory for
people shown in Experiment 1 would still take place when paired
participants were close to each other.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was designed to evaluate whether or not the self-
reference effect on memory for people still occurred when paired
participants were close to each other.
Method
Participants
Sixteen pairs of romantic partners and one pair of best friends
(18 females, 16 males) participated in the second experiment.
The mean duration of the relationship was 5.2 years (SD = 4.5).
These 34 participants were aged between 19 and 54 (M = 28.4;
SD = 8.1), and their average educational level measured by the
number of years of study completed to achieve their highest
qualification was 16.4 (SD = 3.2). The sample included 29
French-speaking Belgians, 3 French and 2 perfect bilingual
Luxembourgers. The mean absolute age difference between pair
members was 2.9 (SD = 3.6). This study was approved by the
Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Psychology, Speech and
Language Therapy, and Education of the University of Liège.
All participants gave their written informed consent prior to
participation.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1 except that
participants within a pair were partners or best friends, and they
were invited to recall people with the same first name as their own
and people with the same first name as their partner/friend.
Results and Discussion
Participants reported a greater number of people sharing their
own first name (M = 5.65; SD = 2.98) than did their paired
participants (M = 3.76; SD = 1.95), paired t(33) = 4.96,
p < 0.0001, (Mdiff Self vs. Other = 1.88 [1.11, 2.65]; Cohen’s
d = 0.86 [0.35, 1.37]). Over the 192 reported persons sharing
the participants’ own name, only three persons were members of
participants’ biological family.
The analysis relating to the persons whose existence was
verified also indicated that participants reported more people
sharing their own first name (M= 3.24; SD= 2.09) than did their
paired participants (M = 1.85; SD = 1.28), paired t(33) = 4.34,
p < 0.001, (Mdiff Self vs. Other = 1.38 [0.73, 2.03]; Cohen’s
d = 0.75 [0.24, 1.24]).
Experiment 2 showed that the effect of self-reference occurred
even when pairs of participants were close to each other.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous studies have demonstrated that self-related stimuli,
including one’s own name, are particularly powerful cues to
attention and produce self-reference effects on episodic memory.
The present study showed that one’s own name may induce a self-
reference bias in memory for people. Indeed, participants recalled
more familiar (famous or personally known) people with the
same first name as their own than did paired participants. This
difference arose whether paired participants were mere colleagues
(Experiment 1) or close persons such as romantic partners or best
friends (Experiment 2).
The fact that certain names are more prevalent in certain
generations and cultures might have been confounding factors.
However, it is quite unlikely that they really were. Indeed,
all participants were French-speaking Europeans and the age
difference between pair members was on average less than 3 years
in both experiments.
This advantage of self-reference over reference to close others
is at odds with results of prior studies that tested the classical self-
reference effect on episodic memory and reported a reduction
or an elimination of the effect when the comparison target was
close to the participant (Bower and Gilligan, 1979; Symons and
Johnson, 1997). However, consistent with the present study, Sui
et al. (2012, Experiment 3D) reported faster responses after self-
reference than after reference to close others (best friends) in a
task consisting of verifying arbitrary associations between a name
(self/best friend) and a geometric shape. It is possible that self-
reference is more efficient than reference to close others when
tasks do not require an explicit personality evaluation through the
activation of a rich elaborative memory representation. In the Sui
et al. (2012) task, as in the present study, the self-reference effect
may simply result from an attentional advantage at encoding that
helped to form associations between one’s own name and co-
occurring stimuli [geometrical shapes in the Sui et al. (2012) study
or encountered individuals in the present study]. In other words,
Cunningham’s (2016) theoretical proposal that the self-reference
effect in memory is supported by an attentional advantage
at encoding may explain the effect described here. However,
the role of retrieval processes in the occurrence of this effect
should be tested. This could be done by using divided-attention
manipulation at the retrieval phase.
Previous research has reported a self-attention bias for self-
related stimuli other than one’s own name, e.g., one’s own face
(Brédart et al., 2006; Tacikowski and Nowicka, 2010), hometown,
phone number or year of birth (Gray et al., 2004). However, it
remains to be evaluated whether one’s own name is particularly
prone to elicit a self-reference effect on memory or other self-
cues may elicit the effect too. One’s own name possesses several
favorable properties. It is a stimulus that people usually like. For
instance, people show a preference for the letters occurring in
their own names (this preference is known as the Name-Letter
Effect; for a review see Hoorens, 2014). It is also an extremely
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familiar stimulus to which humans are sensitive as early as 4–
5 months of age (Mandel et al., 1995; Parise et al., 2010). It has
been previously shown that one’s own birthday may induce a self-
reference effect: participants were more likely to recall a friend’s
birthday when it was close to their own birthday than when it was
distant (Kesebir and Oishi, 2010; Rathbone and Moulin, 2010).
However, more systematic research is needed to evaluate whether
self-related cues other than one’s own name (e.g., year of birth,
brand of car) can elicit a self-reference effect on memory for
people.
CONCLUSION
The results of the present study indicate that we are particularly
good at retrieving people named like us.
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